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Better Together and the No Campaign:
from Project Fear to Grace?
Better Together et la campagne pour le 'non'
Fiona Simpkins
1 The major cross-party No campaign, Better Together, was launched a month after Yes
Scotland, on 25th June 2012, at Edinburgh’s Napier University by former Chancellor of the
Exchequer,  Alistair  Darling.  Although  the  name  chosen  for  the  campaign,  Better
Together, deliberately omitted the terms Union or unionist and sounded positive and
respectful of both unionists and nationalists alike, its message generally failed to meet
the target that its name initially suggested. We shall see that the campaign, based on the
idea of getting the best out of both worlds – by enjoying the benefits of devolution as well
as a union with the rest of the UK – or of the referendum debate being about “what unites
us, not about what divides us” as Alistair Darling announced in his inauguration speech of
the Better Together campaign in June 2012, soon showed more signs of division than
unity while its tone became increasingly negative. In fact, the debate was dragged into
bitter disputes over the financial risks entailed by independence, the looming spectre of
recession, the loss of Scotland’s EU membership and other cataclysmic-like scenarios to
name but a few. One of the reasons for this turn of events was the length of the campaign,
which,  if  the  long  campaign  preceding  the  16-week  official  campaign  is  taken  into
account, represents the longest electoral campaign in modern British political history.
Another rests with the composition and nature of the No campaign itself. Faced with an
increasingly successful nationalist party in Scotland which could boast of being the first
Scottish  party  in  terms of  electoral  support  and of  representing  Scotland’s  interests
rather than UK-wide interests like the three main British parties campaigning for Better
Together, the No campaign was naturally entrenched in a defensive position whilst the
SNP played the role of challenger.  Furthermore, it  represented the common effort of
three otherwise unlikely-minded British parties to work together and publicly collaborate
to safeguard the Union. The difficulties that this collaboration represents were immense
in that the three participating parties had distinct electoral  and political  histories in
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Scotland and each faced inner divisions and distinct challenges which this paper seeks to
examine.
 
Organisation, action and finance of the Better
Together campaign
2 Better Together was established as the official umbrella organisation of the No campaign.
It was created as a cross-party body which would gather the three pro-union parties
(Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberal-Democrats) as well as all those not affiliated to
a political party, and which would be run by a cross-party Board of Directors. The Board
included five members and somewhat represented the electoral strengths of the three
parties  in  that  three  of  its  members  were  Labour  (including  its  chairman,  Alistair
Darling), one was a Conservative and the last a Liberal Democrat. Together with Darling,
the  Board  thus  included Labour  MSPs  Jackie  Baillie  and  Richard  Baker,  the  late
Conservative  MSP  David  McLetchie  (1952-2013),  and  Craig  Harrow,  convener  of  the
Scottish Liberal Democrats. The strategic mastermind of Better Together, however, would
be its Campaign Director, Blair McDougall, a high profile Labour political advisor who ran
David Miliband’s campaign for the Labour Party leadership in 2010. He also worked as an
advisor to Jim Murphy’s successful Scottish Labour Party leadership election bid. Other
full  time  employees  of  the  campaign  included  a  Director  of  Communications  (Rob
Shorthouse), a Press Officer (David Ross), a Policy and Strategy Adviser (Jim Gallagher –
who previously served as secretary to the Calman commission), as well as a Research and
Engagement Officer (Gordon Aikman), a National Campaign Organiser (Rob Murray) and
Local  Campaign Organisers.  The  team were  in  charge  of  formulating  the  campaign’s
slogans and messages, which were previously tested through focus groups, developing
network channels through which information could be conveyed, mobilising volunteers
as well as training and briefing them on media management, doorstep canvassing and
voter pools targeting, and finally organising events, social media activities and meetings
throughout the country.1 The structure offered by the Better Together campaign was thus
much more centralised and its grasp over both the message content and the means of
communication used by activists more extensive than the Yes campaign which allowed its
activists and sub-campaigning groups more leeway and spontaneity.2 
3 Using the model  set  up by the Yes  Scotland campaign,  Better  Together  also created
interest  groups such as  Rural  Better  Together  (launched at  the 2013 Royal  Highland
Show),  Forces  Together  (awkwardly  launched  by  Alistair  Darling  at  the  Scottish
Conservative conference) or Academics Together. The idea behind those subgroups was
for their members to call people with similar professional activities in order to identify
undecided voters before trying to convince them of voting no. Other subgroups were
created based on locality such as Better Together Airdrie and Better Together Crieff, or
even both interests and locality with Better Together Aberdeen Youth and Students for
instance. 
4 Better Together also launched a new initiative to target undecided voters in the summer
of 2013 with the Blether Together campaign. This initiative was the product of Better
Together’s appointment of Blue State Digital, the agency that worked on the successful
first election campaign for US President Obama. The recruitment drive using social media
and YouTube was launched in an attempt at recruiting volunteers who were given the
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personal details of members of the public and asked to cold-call them in order to canvass
them for  support.  All  information  gleaned  by  the  calls  was  stored  in  the  campaign
database and transmitted to the three parties involved in Better Together. This initiative
followed a rather controversial one launched in April 2013 of unsolicited text messages
and although its beginnings were similarly surrounded with controversy due to the fact
that people’s personal details and information were at risk of being disclosed to outside
organisations,  the  Blether  Together  campaign  became rather  successful  in  terms  of
volunteer  recruitment  (more  than  3,500  volunteers  signed  up).  Finally,  the  credit-
checking  group  Experian  was  also  hired  by  Better  Together  to  devise  a  new  data
management tool. The Patriot software database stored all consumer data obtained from
lenders and companies who voters have contracts with and allowed Better Together to
identify lifestyle indicators, categorise voters and link them with activists of a similar age
or with similar social media friends in order to improve voter targeting and canvassing.
5 Third party endorsements also featured highly in the Better Together campaign as it was
initially somewhat more successful than its rival at recruiting high-profile non politicians
to support its cause. The SNP had made much of third party endorsements during its
successful May 2011 Scottish Parliament election campaign and Better Together aimed at
following this model and mobilising as much support as possible in order to break away
from an all political image. It thus put forward the support of several sportsmen such as
Gavin Hastings, Alex McLeish, Chris Hoy and Alex Fergusson, as well as musicians, writers
and actors including Sharleen Spiteri, J.K. Rowling, Ewan McGregor and Billy Connolly.
Their support featured prominently in social media such as Twitter and Facebook, which
a March 2014 study from the University of Strathclyde shows were equally used by both
the Better Together and Yes Scotland campaigns.3 Although the study shows that the Yes
Scotland campaign got more support on online social media, its authors linked this to the
age groups social media users generally belong to.4 In any case, social media did play an
important role in local campaigning especially as it enabled Better Together to mobilise
more volunteers and disseminate information.
6 In fact, much of the No campaign focused on local campaigning and relied primarily on
community-based  activities.  It  was  felt  that  identifying  potential  sympathisers  or
undecided  voters  and  using  traditional  campaigning  methods  such  as  canvassing,
leafleting  and  organising  meetings  would  be  much more  efficient  on  a  local  basis.
National media channels were of course used to formulate a wider message and reach the
electorate as a whole but the focus of the campaign as we have seen was on targeting
voters and putting them in contact with trusted local figures, like local council members
for instance,  who would be better able to get  the message across.  The No campaign
furthermore felt less pressure than its opponent in convincing the press and media as a
whole as the latter were generally more sympathetic to their cause, with the Sunday
Herald being the only Scottish newspaper to support a Yes vote. As a matter of fact, the
BBC itself was repeatedly accused of being biased towards the Better Together campaign.5
7 The Better Together campaign was also well-funded although finance was a particular
source of tensions during the campaign. The Electoral Commission published its decision
on spending limits in January 2013 and allowed both the Yes Scotland and the Better
Together  campaigns  to  spend £1,500,000 each during the official  campaign,  which is
equivalent to the spending limits enjoyed by each of Scotland’s main political parties
during  Scottish  Parliament  election  campaigns.  Furthermore,  political  parties
represented in the Scottish Parliament were each allowed to spend amounts relative to
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their political strengths during the official 16-week campaigning period preceding the
referendum (Labour was given a £834,000 limit, the Conservative party £396,000, and the
Liberal Democrats £201,000). Parties could spend as much as they wished prior to the
start of the formal campaign. The main source of controversy rested with the origin of
donations and the disclosure of the list of donors to each party. By April 2013, three of the
four largest donors of the Better Together campaign drew heavy criticism from the Yes
campaign as they were all located outside Scotland (Douglas Flint, former chairman of
HSBC Holdings, Ian Taylor, chief executive of Vitol, and crime writer C.J. Sansom).6 The
£500,000 donation by Scottish oil trader, Ian Taylor, was particularly controversial due to
his links with a Serbian paramilitary leader suspected of war crimes on the one hand and
tax  avoidance  behaviour  in  the  UK  on  the  other.  Although  the  No  campaign  was
repeatedly urged by the Yes camp as well as former Labour First Minister Henry McLeish
and  former  Liberal  Democrat  leader  Lord  Ashdown  to  return  the  donation,  Better
Together declined and put pressure instead on Yes Scotland to release its own list of
donors, which it did in April 2013.
8 One usual source of funding for Labour-led campaigns was remarkably absent from the
2014 independence referendum campaign however as the unions gave little support to
the No campaign. In fact, only the GMB – traditionally seen as more centrist and the
smallest of Scotland’s three main unions – agreed to support Labour during the campaign.
The other two unions, Unite and Unison, traditionally more to the left, refused to endorse
either campaign in the months leading to the independence referendum. Unison stressed
that the union did “not have a policy position, either way”. Its official line as stated on its
website on 2nd July 2014 was the following: “We continue to scrutinise the positions of the
various campaigns and would urge all sides to explain to our members how they intend to
go  about  creating  a  more  just,  fairer  society  in  Scotland.  Any  constitutional  change
should be a means to that end and not an objective in itself”.7 It thus suggested that
neither side of the debate had given sufficient guarantees or convincing arguments on
the  issues  which  were  of  prime  importance  to  the  unions’  work.  Similarly,  Unite
conducted an extensive consultation of its members before its Scottish committee, the
key decision-making body in the union, stated on 18th March 2014 that it would neither
give  a  recommendation  to  its  members  nor  endorse  a  campaign  prior  to  the
independence referendum. Clearly, one of the reasons for this decision was to avoid any
long-lasting divisions within the ranks of the unions’ members over an issue which did
not directly affect its main raison d’être,  as suggested by the following declaration by
Unite:
[I]rrespective of September’s outcome, Unite will continue to fight for the issues
important to our members – jobs, wages, public services, the welfare state, tackling
inequality,  and  better  employment  and  trade  union  rights  –  but  constitutional
changes  whether  it  is  independence  or  greater  devolution  will  mean  different
things  to  different  people  based  on  their  industrial,  social  or  personal
circumstances.8
 
The spin-offs: a symptom of strained relationships
and distinct challenges
9 In  fact,  another  sticking  point  for  the  unions  was  the  awkward  presence  of  the
Conservative party in the Better Together campaign. This was clearly expressed by Dave
Watson9 of Unison in May 2013 when he declared: “While I appreciate the referendum
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campaign has to have a formal Yes and No campaign, most of us in the Labour movement
have a huge difficulty with any campaign that includes the Tories”.10 Notwithstanding the
fact that the Labour party’s Scottish Executive was not consulted in advance about the
creation of Better Together, many within the Scottish Labour party as well as the unions
feared that this close collaboration with the Conservatives might be toxic to Labour’s
electoral fortunes and come back to haunt the party at the next elections of 2015 and
2016. These views are to a large degree responsible for the setting up of another vehicle
for the No campaign, United with Labour, this time with the agreement of the Scottish
Executive.  The campaign was launched in May 2013 by Scottish Labour Party leader,
Johann Lamont as well as deputy leader Anas Sarwar and former Prime Minister Gordon
Brown. It was to enable Labour activists, local branches (CLPs) and trade unionists who
felt uncomfortable in the cross-party campaign to deliver a distinctly Labour message in
favour of  the union and organise grassroots campaigning in areas where Labour was
traditionally well established, especially in the west central belt, where it was believed
that a singular Labour campaign might come across better than Better Together. Gordon
Brown was asked to head the campaign and Anas Sarwar was responsible for liaising
between the two campaigns and the Scottish Labour Party Executive. Both campaigns
worked hand in hand and complemented one another as United with Labour tended to
focus on grassroots campaigning in traditional Labour bastions while Better Together
delivered its message on a wider scale through the media.
10 Scottish Labour also set up its own Devolution Commission charged with examining the
current state of devolution and determining what new powers should be devolved to the
Scottish  Parliament.  It  was  composed  of  three  MSPs  (Scottish  party  leader  Johann
Lamont,  Sarah  Boyack  and  Duncan  McNeil),  three  MPs  (deputy  leader  Anas  Sarwar,
Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland Margaret Curran and Shadow Minister for Work
and Pensions Gregg McClymont), one MEP (Catherine Stihler), as well as representatives
of local government, trade unions and CLPs. Its final report, published in March 2014 was
meant  to  frame  its  view  of  the  constitutional  settlement  in  Scotland  after  the
independence  referendum and of  the  kind of  society  Labour  envisioned in  Scotland.
Indeed, the length of the campaign preceding the referendum meant that the debate
quickly widened to the “larger social vision”11 both camps had of Scotland. Rather than
focusing  on  the  constitutional  intricacies  of  independence,  all  parties  sought  to
differentiate themselves from their political opponents by defining their vision of a post-
referendum Scottish society. This would be particularly the case of the Scottish Labour
party whose social  aspirations and ideals are broadly similar to those of  the SNP,  in
contrast with the clear differences that separates both parties from the Conservative
party  for  instance,  notably  in  terms  of  governance  of  the  welfare  state.  The  debate
therefore shifted to which constitutional settlement would better preserve these social
ideals against what is widely accepted in Scotland as the Conservative party’s relentless
attacks. The focus thus turned to issues such as pensions, which Labour argued would be
better  protected  if  Scotland  rejected  independence,  or  attacks  on  Alex  Salmond’s
proposal  to  abolish  the  Corporation  Tax,  which  Labour  warned  would  reduce  tax
revenues in Scotland and negatively impact the country’s public services. The March 2014
report of Labour’s Devolution Commission was thus considered as a means to defend the
idea that Scotland’s social democratic values would be best advanced within the union
with fresh powers devolved to the Scottish Parliament, as expressed by the document:
In  this  union  we  pool  and  share  resources  to  ensure  hard-working  people,
pensioners  and  those  in  need  have  equal  economic,  social  and  political  rights
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throughout the entire UK. This is an idea – founded on solidarity, community and
fairness – that is much greater than any notion of creating an independent state.12
11 The proposals  included in  the  report  were  in  fact  rather  limited and watered down
compared to the interim report of April 2013 which considered full devolution of income
tax. In the end, it promised to set Scottish rates of income tax, including higher rates for
high earners of  at  least  50p in the pound,  block cuts in business taxes and increase
spending on housing together with devolving the responsibility for housing benefits. The
report also foresaw the devolution of Scotland’s only rail franchise as a mutualised “not
for profit” organisation and more powers devolved to local authorities and community
organisations.  Paradoxically,  it  was  in  terms  of  welfare  that  the  Labour  Devolution
Commission was least inclined to decentralise responsibilities, arguing that the welfare
system was better protected by the pooling of UK resources whilst  exposing itself  to
heavy criticism that it was precisely in the union that it suffered from reforms imposed
by Westminster. 
12 The Scottish Labour party, however, was not the only participant in the Better Together
campaign to set up its own campaign and define its singular vision of post-referendum
Scotland. The Conservatives too launched their own “Conservative Friends of the Union”
initiative  at  their  spring  conference  of  March  2012,  which  was  led  by  Scottish
Conservative  Party  leader  Ruth  Davidson  and  then  UK  Conservative  co-chairwoman
Baroness Warsi,  as well as the party’s leader in the Lords, Lord Strathclyde, the then
Welsh  Secretary  Cheryl  Gillian  and  former  First  Minister  of  Northern  Ireland  Lord
Trimble. With only one MP in Scotland (David Mundell), the campaign was an unexpected
success as the Conservatives were pleasantly surprised to receive almost £150,000 in small
donations from 50,000 people within months of  its  creation.  The poor results  of  the
Scottish Conservative party at the 2010 and 2011 elections (winning only one seat at
Westminster and fifteen in Holyrood) meant that that the party fully realised its limits in
Scotland, was quite content to stay at the back of the scene within the Better Together
campaign and let  Labour  take  the  lead.  This  does  not  mean that  the  Conservatives’
involvement was half-hearted. In fact, the Scottish party was quite enthusiastic about the
referendum campaign as it saw it as a unique opportunity to boost its profile and rebuild
support in Scotland. The late Conservative MP David McLetchie was active in the Better
Together  campaign and Annabel  Goldie  and Ruth Davidson were  both present  at  its
launch in Edinburgh’s Napier University. More than anything, the referendum campaign
gave Scottish Conservatives the opportunity to rethink their  position over Scotland’s
constitutional future. 
13 The constitutional debate within the Scottish Conservative Party was first raised by the
Scottish  Conservative  leadership  campaign  which  followed  the  poor  results  of  the
Conservatives in May 2011 (the party won 15 seats with 11.63% of the vote) and the
acknowledgement of a widespread perception that emerged in Scotland in the late 1970s
that the Conservative party is anti-Scottish. One of the main contestants, Murdo Fraser,
was the first to claim that the party had to “see the referendum on independence not as a
threat, but as an opportunity”13 as he launched his leadership bid. Fraser admitted that:
“early opposition to the Scottish Parliament has led us to being portrayed as anti-Scottish
[and] that is still the perception of much of the Scottish electorate”. He thus proposed
that in order “to counter it, we need both an admission and a reality check” and that the
party should move away from the slippery slope argument that held that devolution
would gradually lead to independence and which it had clung to since 1979. He suggested
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that a “new Unionism would provide financial devolution to the Scottish Parliament”.
However,  the  other  main  contestant  in  the  leadership  bid,  Ruth  Davidson,  initially
adopted a contrary view as she claimed that there would be “no half-way house,  no
second question –  no march to  fiscal  autonomy.  When the referendum is  done,  and
Scotland in the Union has won the day, let that be an end to it”.14 Narrowly elected as
leader, she would soon be forced to change her mind by Prime Minister David Cameron’s
own admission in a February 2012 speech that “[t]his does not have to be the end of the
road. When the referendum on independence is over, I am open to looking at how the
devolved settlement can be improved further”.15 
14 The Conservative-led Coalition government’s strategy was to accept the organisation of a
referendum, which was now unavoidable,  on terms it  found acceptable and to avoid
appearing anti-Scottish in a bid to save the union. The new Scottish Conservative leader
thus operated a  complete U-turn and came round to the view initially  expressed by
Fraser.  In March 2013,  she conceded that  “a parliament  with little  responsibility  for
raising the money it spends will never be properly accountable to the people of Scotland.
[...]  So that  means in future a  far  greater  share of  the money spent by the Scottish
Parliament should be raised by it”.16 A working group was set up to “examine specifically
the  question  of  strengthening  devolution  and  the  accountability  of  the  Scottish
Parliament by examining its structures and extending its powers over taxation”. It would
be chaired by Lord Strathclyde and include former Scottish Conservative leader Annabel
Goldie, former Presiding Officer Alex Fergusson as well as constitutional experts Alan
Trench  and  Adam Tomkins.  The  Commission  on  the  Future  Governance  of  Scotland
published its report17 in May 2014 and shared some similarities with the report published
by  Labour’s  own  Devolution  Commission.  Indeed,  the  Conservative  commission  also
suggested that the Scottish Parliament should become responsible for setting rates and
bands of income tax throughout Scotland but that pensions should stay within the remit
of the UK Government. The report admitted that there was a case for devolving housing
benefit and attendance allowance as well as conferring the Scottish Parliament the power
of supplementing benefits legislated for at UK level. Although those proposals for further
devolution are rather timid they do represent a revolution for the Scottish Conservative
party  as  it  finally  came  to  terms  with  devolution  and  even  committed  itself  to
participating  in  a  Scottish  National  Convention  to  consider  Scotland’s  constitutional
future in the event of a no vote, a project suggested by Labour MP Douglas Alexander.
15 If both Labour and the Conservatives shared the similar goal of maintaining the Union
and ensuring that there would be limited change to the status quo, the Liberal Democrats
stood as the odd ones out in the Better Together partnership. The commission set up by
new Scottish leader Willie Rennie and chaired by former leader Menzies Campbell was to
define the Liberal Democrats’ position on the referendum. It reported in 2012 and argued
for a radical decentralisation of tax and borrowing powers to the Scottish parliament,
allowing it to raise two thirds of its revenue. It furthermore reaffirmed the principle
according  to  which  Liberal  Democrats  were  federalists  and  that  a  “rejection  of
independence  will  enable  Scotland  to  continue  down  the  track  towards  a  modern,
pluralist  and  federal  relationship  with  the  other  parts  of  the  United  Kingdom”.18 In
defending federalist ideals and proposing Home Rule for Scotland, the Liberal Democrats
were trying to appeal to both supporters of independence and of the Union. This broad
church message however, was rather absent in the debate due to two factors. The first
was  the  awkward  position  of  the  Liberal  Democrats  in  Scotland.  As  partners  in  the
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coalition,  they  were  potentially  able  to  influence  policy  and  the  Liberal  Democrat
Secretary  of  State  for  Scotland,  Michael  Moore,  gave  them  a  strong  voice  in  the
referendum campaign. This position of strength, though, was adversely affected by the
unpopularity of  their  association  with  the  Conservatives  in  Government  and  the
subsequent loss of support they had suffered in Scotland in the last Scottish Parliament
election. The second was linked to individual party interests and the inherent tensions
within the Better Together campaign. Indeed, although the three parties involved in the
Better Together campaign were working towards the same short-term goal, their long-
term  objectives  in  an  electoral  perspective  or  even,  as  we  have  pointed  out,  in  a
constitutional  perspective  diverged  considerably.  Liberal  Democrat  activists  found  it
difficult to combine with Labour activists in constituencies which they would seek to
recapture or to keep at the next general election. The forthcoming British and Scottish
elections  meant  that  the  partners  of  the  Better  Together  campaign often held  their
electoral interests higher than the message they were meant to deliver. 
 
A fragmented message
16 When Alistair Darling launched the Better Together campaign in June 2012, he stressed
that “those of us who believe that it is best for Scotland to be part of the UK – from
whatever political views – have a duty now to work in harmony to argue for the better,
stronger choice”.19 Yet, this was wishful thinking as the campaign was inevitably dragged
down by internal tensions and divisions. We have seen that, crucially, the three partners
did not share the same vision of post-referendum Scotland and would therefore struggle
to make a positive case for the Union and deliver an inspiring message.  In fact,  the
individual initiatives of the parties fragmented the pro-Union message. The campaign
became less cohesive. Not only did Labour launch its own initiative, United with Labour,
in a bid to distance itself from the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition partners
and in particular with the so-called “bedroom tax”, but some Labour figures such as Jim
Murphy MP went as far as refusing to share a platform with the Prime Minister. Both
leaders of Better Together, Alistair Darling, and United with Labour, Gordon Brown, were
not known to be on particularly friendly terms and the creation of the Better Together
campaign with no prior consultation of the Labour Scottish Executive inevitably created
more  tensions  within  a  party  already  rife  with  personal  disagreements,  traditional
divisions and disputes. Labour’s collaboration with the Coalition Government partners
was  an  easy  target  for  the  SNP,  which  could  present  the  umbrella  campaign  as  a
Conservative-led  initiative  which  gathered  three  British  rather  than  Scottish  parties
which  generally  defended  austerity  policies  and  welfare  cuts.  The  defence  strategy
adopted by the three uneasy partners was to shield behind negative economic analyses
and experts’ assessments aiming at contradicting the SNP’s own statistics – which the
Coalition Government partners in London provided in abundance by coordinating a series
of Scotland Analysis papers presenting the benefits of the Union for Scotland20 – and
attack the trustworthiness of the SNP project. 
17 Given the position of the Better Together campaign as the defender of the status quo, it
had trouble departing from what could generally be considered a negative stance. As the
challenger,  the SNP was able to lead a much more inspiring campaign and deliver a
positive  message  about  the  future  of  an  independent  Scotland.  Inevitably,  criticism
formed the core of the No campaign as it sought to attack the reality of the SNP’s project.
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The campaign, which had rebranded itself Project Fear after deciding to base its message
on the economic risks presented by independence to appeal to undecided voters, was
soon – and sometimes rightly so – accused of scaremongering.21 The nickname given to
the campaign by its own activists was consequently largely exploited by the Yes camp.
Indeed, some stories about Scots facing mobile phone roaming charges, wealthy Scots and
business  owners  fleeing  the  country  overnight  after  a  Yes  vote  or  Lord  Robertson’s
warnings of the “cataclysmic” effect on European and global stability with the risk of
“emboldening dictators and annexers around the world”22 gave credence to accusations
of scaremongering. Former Labour First Minister Henry McLeish even advised his party
to leave the campaign as he sarcastically remarked: “Next they’ll be saying there will be
seven years of famine in an independent Scotland and that aliens will land here”.23 This
led Labour chief strategist Douglas Alexander, drafted into the Better Together campaign
in its final months, to introduce the idea of a more positive-sounding message with the
No Thanks slogan that was inspired by Canadian former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s
final speech in the 1995 Quebec referendum campaign.24
18 The  core  of  Better  Together’s  criticism  however  was  based  on  alarming  economic
analyses  as  campaigners  strove to  stress  that  the Scottish economy was  inextricably
associated with the UK economy and that turning Scotland’s  biggest  market into its
biggest competitor would be damaging to Scotland. Scots, it warned, would subsequently
be worse off in an independent Scotland. The campaign raised the spectre of recession,
higher taxation, a freeze on public spending and subsequent cuts in public sector jobs,
cuts in old-age pensions and public services. It especially stressed the currency issue as
Alex Salmond’s promise of a currency union with the rest of the UK was undermined by
the British parties’ stubborn refusal to even consider it a possibility. The Better Together
campaign made much of the negative impact of the European currency union, arguing
that the rest of the UK would refuse to enter a currency union with a potentially unstable
economic partner. The famous Plan B question to Alex Salmond became a leitmotiv to the
No campaign and certainly gave Alistair Darling an edge over Salmond during the first
televised debate of the official campaign. Other arguments came to feed this discourse as
the amount of oil reserves were questioned as well as the unpredictability of oil prices, so
was the process for EU membership application for an independent Scotland, the risks of
being imposed the euro and the Schengen area if there was a new application process, the
end of the European rebate, etc. 
19 There was in fact little to inspire voters throughout the No campaign but the goal was to
raise anxiety and distrust about the SNP project and dampen the enthusiasm that the Yes
campaign might stir in the electorate by opposing facts and figures, experts’ opinions and
analyses which contradicted those brought forward by the Scottish Government.  The
expertise brought by both camps on a series of subjects meant that the economics of a
future independent Scotland could be read both ways and that there was little to help
voters decide whether one expert was right over another. However, the No campaign
drew its strength from the fact that anxiety and uncertainty can be potent factors in
determining a vote and much was thus made of the idea of independence being a leap in
the dark. If the overall tone of the No campaign was indeed negative, its moment of grace
came  from  an  unlikely  source  when  former  Prime  Minister  Gordon  Brown  gave  an
inspired speech one day before the referendum in which he finally breathed life into the
No campaign and was able to combine a passionately patriotic Scottish sentiment with
the Union. It is doubtful whether the No campaign’s last minute moment of grace was
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sufficient to win the referendum but it did finally mean that there was more to the union
than the economic analyses that it had presented all along. It suggested that there was
another way of feeling Scottish and having Scotland’s best interests at heart, one that had
been absent from the campaign all along but which a small majority of Scots expressed on
18th September 2014.
20 The spirit of unity expressed by Brown’s speech would, however, be lacking both in the
response  to  the  referendum  results  by  the  unionist  parties  involved  in  the  Better
Together campaign as much as in the Labour Party itself, whose Scottish leader Johann
Lamont would resign on 24th October 2014 citing the lack of autonomy of the Scottish
Labour Party which she felt was treated like a “branch office of London” by the Labour
leadership.25 After Johann Lamont’s resignation, it appeared less likely that the Labour
Party, which seemingly refused to give any autonomy to its Scottish leadership, would
decentralise further powers to Holyrood if it were to be elected at the general election of
May 2015. Indeed, a YouGov poll for the Times published on 3rd February 2015 found that
a mere 15% of all Scots, and 52% only among Labour voters, said Miliband’s party could
best use its influence to secure more powers to the Scottish Parliament. It is noteworthy
however that 64% of respondents felt that the SNP would be most likely to deliver further
powers to Holyrood. Both the idea that a Labour government is unlikely to deliver more
powers  to  the  Scottish  Parliament  and  the  proximity  between  Labour  and  the
Conservative Party during the independence referendum campaign are therefore potent
factors in the current electoral trend in Scotland of a sweeping swing to the SNP at the
next  general  election.26 It  is  furthermore  questionable  whether  the  election  of  Jim
Murphy as the new Scottish Labour Party leader will help Labour to save its Scottish
seats. Not only is Jim Murphy seen as a close figure to Westminster politics due to his
years as Minister of State for Europe and Secretary of State for Scotland under the Brown
government, but his bid to lead his electoral campaign on a “Vote SNP, get the Tories”
slogan may prove to be self-defeating after Labour and the Conservatives were seen to
share the same political platform during the referendum campaign. 
21 In reality, the three major partners of the Better Together campaign – and signatories of
a  last-minute  joint  statement27 to  transfer  significant  more  powers  to  the  Scottish
Parliament in a bid to save the Union after a series of polls showed the Yes vote ahead –
shared  little  in  common  regarding  their  management  of  the  aftermath  of  the
independence referendum in Scotland. In his speech following the announcement of the
referendum results,  Conservative  Prime Minister  David  Cameron determined that  he
would balance the promise of further devolved powers to the Scottish Parliament with
the question of “English votes on English laws”. Although the move was made in order to
outplay both the Ukip and Labour parties in England before the general election of May
2015,  the  idea  that  the  pledge to  devolve  more powers  to  Holyrood would be  made
contingent upon English-only votes at Westminster was akin to “trying to snatch defeat
from the jaws of victory” according to Liberal Democrat Chief Secretary of the Treasury
and leading Better  Together  strategist  Danny Alexander.28 In  the  early  hours  of  19 th
September, Alistair Darling himself warned the Prime Minister that it would immediately
allow  the  SNP  to  turn  the  focus  to  the  future,  use  the  momentum  created  by  the
referendum campaign to demand more powers for the Scottish Parliament and present
new  grievances  over  English-only  votes  at  Westminster.  Significantly,  Alex  Salmond
assured in his resignation speech on the same day that the “dream will never die” as he
handed the leadership of  the SNP to his  Deputy First  Minister Nicola Sturgeon,  thus
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signalling  that  the  referendum page  was  turned  but  a  new battle  was  beginning.  It
remains to be seen whether the SNP will be able to confirm its lead and snatch a majority
of Scottish seats at the general election of May 2015 to deliver upon the promises of a
more powerful Scottish Parliament and to establish the kind of Scottish society which
would respond to the wishes of nationalists and unionists alike and whose shape emerged
more clearly during the independence referendum campaign.
22 Books and official publications
23 ADAMSON,  K.  &  LYNCH,  P.  (eds.)  Scottish  Political  Parties  and  the  2014  Independence
Referendum. Cardiff: Welsh Academic Press, 2014.
24 SCOTTISH CONSERVATIVES. Commission on the Future Governance of Scotland. May 2014.
25 SCOTTISH  LABOUR  DEVOLUTION  COMMISSION.  Powers  for  a  Purpose  –  Strengthening
Accountability and Empowering People. March 2014.
26 SCOTTISH LIBERAL DEMOCRATS. Federalism: The Best Future for Scotland, The Report of the
Home Rule and Community Commission of the Scottish Liberal Democrats. October 2012.
Alistair Darling, Better Together Launch speech, 25th June 2012, https://
secure.bettertogether.net/press/entry/full-transcript-of-the-launch-event-speech-by-
alistair-darlingRuth Davidson speech, Winning for Scotland, 9th September 2011, online
video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=99r68XFpMDU
27 Ruth Davidson,  Strengthening Scotland,  Taking Scotland Forward speech,  26th March
2013,  http://www.scottishconservatives.com/2013/03/strengthening-devolution-taking-
scotland-forward/
28 Murdo Fraser speech, 5th September 2011, ‘Murdo Fraser reveals plans for new Scottish
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ABSTRACTS
Better Together was the main umbrella organisation of the No camp during the 2014 Scottish
independence  referendum  campaign.  It  represented  the  common  effort  of  three  otherwise
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unlikely-minded  British  parties  to  work  together  and  publicly  collaborate  to  safeguard  the
Union.  The  difficulties  that  this  collaboration  represents  were  immense  in  that  the  three
participating parties  had distinct  electoral  and political  histories  in  Scotland and each faced
inner divisions and distinct challenges which this paper seeks to examine.
Better Together fut la principale organisation multi-partite à œuvrer pour un vote « non » lors de
la campagne pour le référendum sur l’indépendance écossaise de 2014. Elle représente les efforts
communs de trois partis politiques très différents au plan idéologique pour travailler de concert
afin de sauvegarder l’Union britannique. Les difficultés que cette collaboration a soulevées furent
immenses :  ces  trois  partis  sont  héritiers  de  traditions  politiques  et  d’histoires  électorales
distinctes en Écosse, et chacun d’entre eux dut faire face à des divisions internes et à des défis
distincts que cet article se propose de mettre en lumière.
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